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Abstract
The liberalisation of xed-term contracts in Europe has led to a two-tier regime, with a growing
share of jobs covered by temporary contracts. The paper proposes a matching model with direct search
in which temporary and permanent jobs coexist in a long-run equilibrium. When temporary contracts
are allowed, rms are willing to open permanent jobs in as much as their job lling rate is faster than that
of temporary jobs. From the labour demand standpoint, a simple trade-o¤ emerges between an ex-ante
job lling rate and ex-post exible dismissal rate. The model thus features a natural sorting of rms
and workers into permanent and temporary jobs. It is also consistent with the observation that workers
hired on a permanent contract receive more training. Empirically, we test with Italian longitudinal data
whether non-employment spells that lead to a temporary job are shorter on average. We nd that, other
things being equal, the transition intensity of exit towards temporary jobs is higher than to permanent
jobs. The other empirical implications, and notably the e¤ects of training, are coherent with the existing
literature.
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1 Introduction
The liberalisation of temporary contracts, or xed-term contracts as are often dened in the policy debate,
has been the main labour market reform in continental Europe during the last decades. The liberalisation
applies only to new hires, so that only new jobs and new vacancies can potentially be advertised and lled
with temporary contracts. Existing jobs, covered by open-ended contracts, are not directly a¤ected by the
reform. As a result, a two-tier regime has emerged in many continental European markets, with a growing
share of temporary contracts, which peaked to 14.5 in 2007, at the outset of the great recession [European
Commission 2010]. As the stock of open-ended jobs dies out by natural turnover, many observers and policy
analysts wonder whether the share of temporary contracts will eventually absorb the entire labour market.
This paper shows that the latter implication is not likely, and that permanent and temporary workers are
likely to coexist in the long run, even with homogeneous labour from the labour demand standpoint.
In the existing literature, the long-run implications of a labour market with both temporary and perma-
nent contracts are not fully understood. In a pure labour demand setting with risk-neutral homogeneous
workers and without market frictions, temporary jobs should indeed take over the entire labour market.
Boeri and Garibaldi [2007] study theoretically and empirically the transition from a rigid system with only
permanent contracts to a dual system with temporary and permanent contracts. In the aftermath of the
liberalisation, no vacancies covered by permanent contracts are posted, and the stock of temporary con-
tracts absorbs the entire workforce. Similar implications are held by various papers [Blanchard and Landier
2002; Cahuc and Postel Vinay 2002] and ad hoc assumptions ensure that temporary and permanent contract
coexist in equilibrium1 .
This paper studies rms and workerssorting into permanent and temporary contracts in an imperfect
labour market. Specically, it studies vacancy posting in permanent and temporary jobs in a world with
matching frictions and direct search. From the labour demand standpoint, a lled job with a temporary
and exible contract is more protable to a rm, since it allows the rm to easily adjust labour in the
face of adverse productivity shocks. However, free entry in each submarket implies that in equilibrium
jobs advertised with permanent contracts display a larger job lling rate. A simple trade-o¤ thus emerges
between an ex-ante slower job lling rate and ex-post more exible dismissal rate. In other words, rms that
post jobs with temporary contracts face longer job lling rate. This mechanism is akin to wage posting and
to the competitive search equilibrium initially proposed by Moen [1997].
From the labour supply standpoint, a similar mechanism emerges. For a given wage within the bargaining
set, in the spirit of Hall [2005], risk-neutral workers with heterogeneous and unobservable reservation utility,
prefer more job security, i.e. a permanent contract. Yet, in as much as job search in the submarket for
1 In Cahuc and Postel Vinay [2002] temporary and permanent contracts coexist in light of a random and exogenous state
permission to ll jobs with temporary contracts. In Blanchard and Landier [2002] all jobs start with a temporary contract, and
only a fraction is endogenouesly converted into a permanent job. Garibaldi and Violante [2005] have similar implications.
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temporary workers leads to larger job lling rate, also a labour supply trade-o¤ emerges between an ex-ante
lower job nding rate and an ex-post larger retention rate2 . As a result the model features a natural sorting
of rms and workers into permanent and temporary jobs.
The simple theory has several implications. First, the coexistence of temporary and permanent contracts
implies that in equilibrium temporary jobs lead to faster job nding rate for workers. This is true even when
workers can graduate to a permanent position via a temporary job. Second, the steady state of the model
displays both temporary and permanent jobs, with an equilibrium share of temporary jobs that crucially
depends on the average duration of temporary contracts and the structure of productivity shocks. Third,
the liberalisation of temporary contracts does not crowd out permanent contracts, and the labour market
moves smoothly toward a long-run dual system. Fourth, when rms have the option to undertake costly
training in the aftermath of adverse productivity shocks, the theory clearly implies that workers covered
with permanent contracts are more likely to be trained.
While the existing empirical literature on temporary/permanent jobs is large, the basic implicit mecha-
nism proposed by the model has not been directly tested. Empirically, we use Italian longitudinal data to
test whether unemployment spells that lead to a temporary job are shorter on average. We run a competing
risks model on a sample of workers who entered the labour market between 1998 and 2003 and nd that,
other things being equal, the transition intensity of exit towards temporary jobs is higher than to permanent.
We also review the rest of the empirical implications, and notably the e¤ects of training, and we nd it fully
coherent with the existing literature
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the structure of the model and the basic equations.
Section 3 denes and solves the equilibrium. Section 4 studies analytically the transition toward a dual
regime and presents a simple set of simulations. Section 5 introduces the option to train workers in the
aftermath of adverse shocks. Section 6 studies the model with on-the-job search. Section 7 presents the
empirical analysis. Section 8 discusses other implications of our theory vis-à-vis the existing empirical
evidence. Section 9 concludes.
2 The matching framework
The labour market consists of a mass one of risk-neutral workers. Workers are fully attached to the labour
market and if they are out of work, they actively search for a job. Employed workers are subject to natural
turnover and separate from their existing job with a Poisson process with arrival rate equal to s.
Workers di¤er in their idiosyncratic income from non-employment. The outside ow utility is indicated
with z; and we assume that z is time invariant and not observable to the rms. z is drawn from a continuous
2A similar implication, at least from the labour supply standpoint, emerges in the quantitative general equilibrium model
proposed by Alonso-Borrego et al. [2005]. The free entry condition in both markets, a key feature of the mechanism of this
paper, is anyway not modelled by Alonso-Borrego et al.
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cumulative distribution F (z) with upper support zu. Since z is not observable, workers are identical vis-à-vis
the rms.
Firms produce with a constant return to scale technology with labour productivity equal to yh. Each job
has an instantaneous probability  of experiencing a (permanent) adverse shock. Conditional on an adverse
shock, the productivity falls to yl < yh. We further assume that the wage paid is strictly larger than zu so
that the labour market is viable for each worker.
Two types of contracts exist in the economy. Temporary contracts and permanent contracts. Tempo-
rary contracts can be broken by the rm at will3 . Firm-initiated separation is not possible with permanent
contracts. Firms that hire workers on permanent contracts must rely on workersnatural turnover for down-
sizing. Firms create jobs by posting costly vacancies, and rms can freely decide to open either temporary
or permanent jobs. Keeping open a vacancy, either temporary or permanent, involves a ow cost equal to c.
For simplicity, we assume that the vacancy cost is identical for both contracts.
Temporary and permanent contracts are o¤ered in di¤erent submarkets. In each submarket, the meeting
of unemployed workers and vacant rms is described by a well-dened matching function m with constant
returns to scale. Submarkets are indexed by i 2 [p; t] where p stands for permanent and t for temporary.
Unemployed workers can freely move across submarkets but can not search simultaneously across submarkets.
In this respect, search is directed toward a specic submarket (this hypothesis will be relaxed in section 6).
Unemployed workers searching for a permanent job enjoy a xed exogenous benet b > 0. b is not enjoyed
when the worker searches in the temporary submarket. In real-life labour markets, unemployed income often
requires a specic on-the-job tenure, and our assumption is fully consistent with this fact.
There are matching frictions in each submarket. We let m(ui; vi) be the ow of new matches, where
ui denotes the measure of unemployed workers in submarket i searching for the measure vi of vacancies;
following standard assumptions, we assume that m is concave and homogeneous of degree one in (ui; vi)
with continuous derivatives. Now dene hi = m(ui; vi)=ui = m(1; i) = h(i) as the transition rate from
unemployment to employment for an unemployed worker in submarket i and qi = m(ui; vi)=vi = q(i) as
the arrival rate of workers for a vacancy in submarket i. i = vi=ui is the submarket-specic labour market
tightness. The matching function m satises the following conditions:
lim
i!0
h(i) = lim
i!1
q(i) = 0 i = p; t
lim
i!1
h(i) = lim
i!0
q(i) =1 i = p; t
Upon the meeting of an unemployed worker and a vacant rm, each match signs a long-term contract
that x a wage for the entire employment relationship without ex-post renegotiations. In the spirit of Hall
[2005], any wage within the parties bargaining set, at the time of job creation, can be supported as an
equilibrium. To make the problem interesting, we restrict our attention to wages such that yh > wp > yl
3The interpretation of dismissal at will in the case of temporary workers is twofold: either rms are allowed to re whenever
the shock occurs, or theyre able to set contracts whose duration is exactly 1=(s+ )
4
and yh > wt > yl. This will ensure that, conditional on the realisation of the adverse shock , permanent
contracts involve a loss to the rm. Further, we will focus on a constant wage across submarket, such that
wp = wt = w.
The equilibrium of the model is characterised by free entry of rms in each submarket, and workers
sorting condition across submarkets.
2.1 Value Functions and Job Creation in the Permanent Market
Let Up(z) and Ep(z) denote, respectively, the expected discounted income for an unemployed worker and for
an employed one in the permanent market. The Bellman equations are:
rUp(z) = z + b+ h(p)[Ep(z)  Up(z)] (1)
rEp(z) = w + s[Up(z)  Ep(z)] (2)
where r is the pure discount rate, z is the workersspecic outside option and b is the unemployment benet.
Let Jhp and J
l
p denote, respectively, the present discounted value of a permanent job when productivity is
high (yh) or low (yl); their formal expression read
rJhp = yh   w + [J lp   Jhp ] + s[Vp   Jhp ]
rJ lp = yl   w + s[Vp   J lp]
When productivity is high, the rm enjoys an operational prot equal to yh w. The worker leaves at rate s
and the rm gets the expected value of a vacancy formally indicated with Vp. Conditional on a productivity
shock , the rm has no margin of adjustment and experiences a capital loss equal to the di¤erence between
the value of a permanent job in high state and a value in bad state J lp Jhp . In the low state, the rm runs
an operational loss yl   w as long as the worker separates at rate s. The asset equation of a vacancy reads
rVp =  c+ q(p)[Jhp   Vp]
Assuming free entry in the permanent market, Vp = 0, we have that
c = q(p)J
h
p (3)
The previous condition is one of the key equations of the model. It shows that the ow cost of vacancy
posting is equal to expected benet, where the latter is described as the product of the job lling rate into
permanent contract time the value of a lled job.
Finally note that the value of a lled job can be written as
Jhp =
yh   w
r + s+ 
+
(yl   w)
(r + s)(r + s+ )
(4)
J lp =
yl   w
r + s
< 0
The latter expression represents the cost associated to having a permanent contract in case of adverse shock.
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2.2 Value Functions and Job Creation in the Temporary Market
Workers employed with a temporary contract are dismissed conditional on the arrival rate , so that the
value of employment reads
rEt(z) = w + (s+ )[Ut(z)  Et(z)] (5)
The value of unemployment depends on the specic outside income and faces a transition probability h(t)
rUt(z) = z + h(t)[Et(z)  Ut(z)] (6)
Firms in temporary market are free to dismiss workers conditional on the adverse productivity shock; the
value of a lled temporary job and of a temporary vacancy read
rJht = yh   w + (s+ )[Vt   Jht ]
rVt =  c+ q(t)[Jht   Vt]
Assuming free entry also in the temporary market, Vt = 0, we have that
c = q(t)J
h
t (7)
Similarly to the condition above, equation (7) says that the ow cost of vacancy in the temporary market
is equal to expected benet, where the latter is described as product of the job lling rate into temporary
contract time the value of a lled job.
Before turning to the equilibrium denition, we derive the second key condition of our analysis. Using
the free entry condition into the temporary market, one can easily show that a lled temporary job has
larger value than a permanent job
Jt;h =
yh   w
r + s+ 
> Jp;h
We are now in a position to establish a key result of our model. The expected value of vacancy depends
on the job lling rate and on the value of a lled job. A labour market with both temporary and permanent
jobs is such that
q(t)J
h
t = q(p)J
h
p
where we have just proved that Jht > J
h
p . This result tells that the coexistence of temporary and permanent
contract implies that
q(t) < q(p)
Once the job is lled, the rms prefer a exible contract. They are thus willing to o¤er both temporary
and permanent contract if the job lling rate for permanent contracts is larger than the job lling rate for
temporary contracts. Conversely, this result suggests that the job nding rate of a temporary contract is
larger, so that
h(t) > h(p)
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Figure 1: Workersendogenous sorting
The previous result is very important for the results of the next section, where we discuss the workerssorting
condition between the two submarkets.
2.3 WorkersSorting
Workers take as given the job nding rate4 and optimally decide in which submarket to search for a job.
Since workers can freely move across submarkets, the optimal allocation will be
U(z) =Max[Up(z); Ut(z)]
where the expressions for Up(z) and Ut(z) are obtained combining (2) with (1) and (5) with (6)
rUp(z) =
(z + b)(r + s) + h(p)w
r + s+ h(p)
(8)
rUt(z) =
z(r + s+ ) + h(t)w
r + s+ + h(t)
(9)
The values of unemployment, for given job nding rates, are monotonically increasing in z: In what follows,
we look for a reservation value of R such that the marginal worker (the one with idiosyncratic outside
option z = R) is indi¤erent between searching for a temporary or a permanent job. If such R exist, workers
endogenously sort between the two markets. Note that workers with low z place a larger willingness to work.
Such workers are more willing to take up a job right away, even if such job has shorter duration. The formal
value of R is
R = w   b (r + s)[r + s+ + h(t)]
(r + s)h(t)  (r + s+ )h(p)
4Once a functional form for the matching function is chosen, i is completely determined by the behaviour of the rms.
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Figure (1), plots the reservation value. As long as the existence condition holds5 , then R < w and there
exists a proportion of workers 1 F (R) searching in the permanent market. Its easy to see that when b = 0
the reservation outside option is equal to the wage and all workers look for a temporary job.
2.4 labour Market Stocks and Flows
labour supply is the sum of unemployment and employment in each submarket
ut + nt = F (R)
up + np = 1  F (R)
The dynamic evolution of unemployment in the two submarket is given by di¤erence between job creation
and job destruction. This implies that
:
up = snp   h(p)up = s[1  F (R)  up]  h(p)up
:
ut = (s+ )np   h(t)ut = (s+ )[F (R)  ut]  h(t)ut
Unemployment in each submarket is constant when job creation is equal to job destruction; the steady state
expressions for the stocks read
up =
s[1  F (R)]
s+ h(p)
np =
h(p)[1  F (R)]
s+ h(p)
ut =
(s+ )F (R)
s+ + h(t)
nt =
F (R)h(t)
s+ + h(t)
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is obtained by a triple ft; p; Rg, and a distribution of employment across states that satisfy
the set of value functions

Jhi ; J
l
p; Vi; Ei(z); Ui(z) with i 2 [p; t]
	
and:
 Optimal vacancy posting in each submarket. The value of a vacancy is identical across submarkets
and driven down to zero by free entry
Vp = Vt = 0
This in turn implies:
 Job creation in the permanent market
q(p)J
h
p = c (JC, permanent)
5See the appendix.
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 Job creation in the temporary market
q(t)J
h
t = c (JC, temporary)
which together say that in equilibrium the expected benet of a permanent job must be equal to
the expected benet of a temporary job.
 Optimal workers sorting. The marginal worker is indi¤erent between searching in the market for
temporary or permanent jobs
Up(R) = Ut(R) (Sorting)
Once a functional form for m(ui; vi) is chosen, p and t are determined through job creation conditions;
the sorting equation yields R and the last equations in the previous section determine the stocks. The
coexistence of the two submarkets depends on a simple condition, as we show next.
Proposition. Temporary and Permanent submarkets coexist in equilibrium as long as the reservation
utility R exists. Further, if R exists, it is also lower than the wage.
Proof, see appendix.
3.1 Comparative Statics
Qualitative aspects of the nal equilibrium obviously depend on the values taken by the exogenous para-
meters. In this section we focus our attention upon the e¤ects of changes from a relevant couple of them,
namely the unemployment benet b and the shock occurrence rate , on the unemployment rate, the labour
market tightness, the reservation outside option and the value (for the rm) of a lled job.
 An increase in the wage w leads to a reduction in market tightness in both submarkets and an increase
in total unemployment. The e¤ect on the two market tightnesses follows directly from a simple dif-
ferentiation of equations JC, permanent and JC, temporary, so that @i@w < 0 while the e¤ect on R is
ambiguous. The latter follows from the fact that both transition rate fall, and it is not clear a priori
which of the transition rate falls more
 From the point of view of the rms, the level of the unemployment benet does not have any direct
e¤ect on the value of a lled job, and using the job creation conditions in the two submarkets, also on
the labour market tightness. In symbols
q(i)J
h
i = c)
@i
@b
=
 c[@Jhi =@b]
[Jhi ]
2[@q(i)=@i]
= 0 since @Jhi =@b = 0
An increase in b makes the permanent submarket more attractive for the workers. Since market tight-
ness does not change, permanent unemployment increases and temporary unemployment decreases.
Formally, using the formal value of R it is immediate to see that, as long as R < w, @R=@b < 0. This
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result allows to evaluate the e¤ect on the unemployment rates
@up
@b
=   s
s+ h(p)
@F (z)
@zjz = R
@R
@b
> 0
and
@ut
@b
=
s+ 
s+ + h(t)
@F (z)
@zjz = R
@R
@b
< 0
as expected. The e¤ect on total unemployment is consequently ambiguous6 .
 An increase in the arrival rate  has various e¤ects, but the overall result is not as clear. If a shock
to the productivity of a match becomes more likely, all rms enjoy the operational prot for a shorter
period; the value of a lled job, either temporary or permanent, diminishes and rms are less prone to
post new vacancies. In formal terms
@Jhp
@
=
yl   yh
(r + s+ )2
< 0 and
@Jht
@
=   yh   w
(r + s+ )2
< 0
Using the result above with job creation conditions in both markets yields the negative reaction of the
labour market tightness
@i
@
=
 c[@Jhi =@]
[Jhi ]
2[@q(i)=@i]
< 0
From the point of view of the workers a higher  makes the duration of a temporary job shorter;
a fraction of them would therefore move from the temporary to the permanent tier but, di¤erently
from the case of the unemployment benet, the productivity shock negatively a¤ects the tightness
in both submarkets too. In other words a trade o¤ emerges between a higher risk of being red on
the temporary market (which has a negative direct e¤ect upon the reservation outside option) and a
possibly too high unemployment duration on the permanent. The net e¤ect of a change in the shock
rate upon R is therefore a priori ambiguous and no prediction can be made upon the unemployment
rates.
4 Liberalisation of Temporary Contracts
While the steady state solution clearly implies a long run coexistence of the two type of contracts, the
question linked to the liberalisation of temporary contracts has not yet been discussed. In this section we
consider the full transition from a rigid regime, a situation where only permanent contracts are allowed, to
a dual regime where temporary and permanent contracts coexist in equilibrium.
The rigid regime is formally described as a labour market in which only the permanent submarket exists.
We dene the introduction of temporary jobs as a permanent unexpected shock to the steady state of the
rigid market. The functioning of the liberalisation is as follows. At time  = 0 when the shock occurs
6With some algebra it can be shown that an increase in the unemployment benet increases total unemployment as long as
 < [h(t)  h(p)]=h(p).
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the stock of unemployed workers of the old regime is immediately split in two: workers with z  R start
searching in the temporary submarket, while workers with z above the reservation productivity R stay in the
permanent one. Firms immediately post vacancies in order to fully absorb any rent. Thereafter, the stock
of workers smoothly move toward a new steady state with two submarkets. Note that both the reservation
utility R as well as market tightness in the two submarkets are time invariant, and the dynamics of the
model can be described analytically.
To keep track of the dynamics of the model after the introduction of temporary contracts, we will consider
separately the behaviour of workers whose outside option is below or above the reservation threshold.
 z  R. At  = 0 all unemployed workers with an outside utility below the reservation utility start
searching for a temporary job at the nding rate h(t). On the demand side, rms post a number
of temporary vacancies such that the tightness jumps to its equilibrium level and ll them at rate
q(t). In addition those workers employed with a permanent contract and idiosyncratic utility below
R are gradually dismissed at rate s and become unemployed in the temporary submarket. The steady
state is reached when all workers with outside utility below the reservation R move to the temporary
submarket. Lets dene with np(z; ) and nt(z; ) the share of permanent and temporary contract with
outside utility less or equal to z at transition time  : ut(z; ) is similarly dened for the unemployment
stock. This implies that at each point in time the distribution of workers with a low outside option
reads
F (z) = np(z; ) + nt(z; ) + ut(z; ); z  R
and the dynamics of the three functions is described by
:
np(z; ) =  snp(z; ); z  R
:
nt(z; ) = h(t)ut(z; )  (s+ )nt(z; ); z  R
:
ut(z; ) = snp(z; ) + (s+ )nt(z; )  h(t)ut(z; ); z  R
where it is clear that there is no inow into np(z; ) for z  R; but simply an outow that dies out as
all permanent jobs with outside utility below R are slowly destroyed at rate s. The ows of temporary
contracts is governed by ows that are identical to those of the steady state.
 z > R. People with outside utility above the reservation R are either employed with a permanent
contract or unemployed and searching for a permanent job. This is true both in the rigid and in the
liberalised regime. Accordingly, the distribution of such workers reads
F (z) = up(z; ) + np(z; ); z > R
where up(z; ) is the stock of unemployed at time  and np(z; ) is the stock of employed workers. The
11
dynamics of these two components is given by
:
up(z; ) = snp(z; )  h(p)up(z; ); z > R
:
np(z; ) = h(p)up(z; )  snp(z; ); z > R
The system of di¤erential equations can be solved analytically. The details are in the appendix. The
readers can nd the nal results below
nt(z; ) =

h(t)h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][h(t) + ]
  h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 

e [h(t)+s+]+
+
h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
  h(t)h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][h(t) + ]
e s
ut(z; ) = F (z)

s
s+ h(p)
+
h(p)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
  s+ 
h(t) + s+ 

e [h(t)+s+]+
+
(s+ )F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
  h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
e s
up(z; ) =
s[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
np(z; ) =
h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e s +
h(p)[1  F (z)]
h(p) + s
Taking the limit as  goes to innity and using z = R, one gets easily the expressions for the two tiers steady
state (see section 2.4).
4.1 Just a honeymoon e¤ect?
Having derived the analytical solution to the transition, we now look into the e¤ects of the liberalisation
of temporary contracts, with particular attention to the unemployment rate. Our solution distinguishes
between a short run and a long run e¤ect.
In the aftermath of the liberalisation, immediately after the shock, the unemployment rate necessarily
falls. The reasoning is as follows. At  = 0 the stock of unemployed workers is as large as in the rigid regime,
but a fraction F (R) of workers starts searching into the temporary submarket where the job nding rate
h(t) is larger. Indeed, market tightness and vacancy posting are a forward looking variable, and immediately
jump to exhaust all the rents. While it is true that in the temporary submarket also the separation rate is
larger through the destruction rate , it takes time for such e¤ect to emerge. Further, market tightness is
constant during the transition. As a result unemployment, initially, necessarily falls7 .
Figures (2) and (3) plot the dynamics of the unemployment and the employment rates for a given set of
parameters values8 . The downward jump represents this honeymoon e¤ect: on impact, the liberalisation
of temporary contracts has a positive e¤ect on total employment.
12
Figure 2: Dynamics of the unemployment rate
Figure 3: Dynamics of the employment rate
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The results on the long run e¤ects are more ambiguous. Whether total unemployment is permanently
lower than in the rigid regime depends on the relative strength of the job nding and job destruction rates
in the two submarkets. The unemployment is permanently reduced if
up;old > up( !1) + ut( !1))
s
s+ h(p)
>
s[1  F (R)]
s+ h(p)
+
(s+ )F (R)
s+ + h(t)
)
 <
s[h(t)  h(p)]
h(p)
(10)
i.e. if workersturnover is not too high9 . This statement, however, needs to be further discussed. Using the
condition for the existence of R one gets
 <
(r + s) fh(t)w   h(p)w   b[r + s+ h(p)w]g
b(r + s) + h(p)w
When b = 0, from the point of view of (10) this condition is not relevant, becoming monotonically binding
for increasing values of the unemployment benet; this means that for small values of the unemployment
benet the coexistence of permanent and temporary contracts does not prevent the labour market from a
higher equilibrium unemployment rate.
5 Training
In this section we consider the possibility that rms, in the aftermath of the adverse productivity shock,
may be able to jump back to the high productivity by undergoing costly training. Specically, we assume
that when the negative shock occurs rms can jump back to the high level of productivity yh by paying a
lump sum cost T in the form of training. As the wage paid to workers is held xed, we can abstract from
the issue of nancing. We will show that there exist two bounds [Tl; Tu] such that if Tl < T < Tu only rms
in the permanent submarket decide to train workers. The asset equations in the permanent market read
rJhp = yh   w + s[Vp   Jhp ] + [max(J lp; Jhp   T )  Jhp ]
rJ lp = yl   w + s[Vp   J lp]
rVp =  c+ q(p)[Jhp   Vp]
7Analitically this result is obtained by taking the time derivative of ut and evaluating it at  = 0; this yields @ut()=@ j =
0 < 0. Details are in the appendix.
8We assumed that the matching function is a Cobb-Douglas one with unemployment elasticity : mi = kiui v
1 
i where
 = 0:5 and ki = 1. Time is expressed in years. The pure discount rate r is 0.02, worker turnover s is 0.1 and the average
waiting time for a productivity shock is about six years ( = 0:15). Productivity is either 1 or, conditional on the adverse
shock, 0.6. The wage is 0.8 and the exogenous benet b for the unemployed on permanent market is 30% of the wage. The cost
of keeping open a vacancy is 0.3.
9The stock of unemployed workers in the old regime is discussed in the appendix
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where the max operator conditional on the  shocks highlights the training option. On the temporary market
the asset equations read
rJht = yh   w + s[Vt   Jht ] + [max(Vt; Jht   T )]
rVp =  c+ q(t)[Jht   Vt]
We now formally establish under what conditions workers with a permanent job receive training. Since
undergoing training transforms a low productivity job into a high productivity job, a rm with a permanent
contract will undergo training if
Jhp   T > J lp
Simultaneously, a rm with a temporary contract will not undergo training if
V > Jht   T
The rst condition implies
yh   w
r + s+ 
+
(yl   w)
(r + s)(r + s+ )
  T > yl   w
r + s
) T < yh   yl
r + s+ 
while the condition on the temporary workers reads
T >
yh   w
r + s+ 
If the cost of training T is large enough so that the exit strategy turns out to be preferable in the temporary
market, but not too large, then only rms in the permanent market are induced to train the workers
yh   w
r + s+ 
< T <
yh   yl
r + s+ 
(11)
More generally, it is never the case that workers receive training only in the temporary market. Training
may be viable on both markets, only in the permanent, or in none of them, depending on the level of T .
When T is bounded as in condition (11) the following interesting results follow:
 The temporary market is not a¤ected by training costs. As a consequence, the value of a lled job is
the same as in the model without training.
 The value of lled jobs in the permanent market now reads
Jhp =
yh   w   T
r + s
which is larger than in the model without training, but still lower than Jht .
 Free entry makes the equilibrium conditions in the temporary submarket independent on T
c = q(p)J
h
p
c = q(t)J
h
t
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This means that in equilibrium the temporary market tightness is the same as without training, while
the permanent tightness has now to be higher. As a consequence, on average, in the model with
training the job nding rate is higher, the arrival rate of workers for a vacancy is lower, and the steady
state overall unemployment is lower.
6 On the Job Search
This section proposes a further extension of the basic model, as it allows workers (either employed or
unemployed) in the temporary tier to search for a permanent job. As we keep the wage constant across
submarkets, we do not need to explicitly consider wage determination, one of the (many) di¢ cult issues to
be faced when one deals with on-the-job search [Nagypal 2006; Shimer 2003]. Nevertheless, the matching
function and the denition of market tightness need to be modied and adjusted. In what follows, the
number of matches in the permanent submarket reads
mp(up + nt + ut; vp) = mp(up + F (R); vp)
where the pool of workers that search for a job is the sum of workers searching only in the permanent market
(up) and the pool of workers searching in the temporary submarket (nt+ut). Since the pool of workers in the
temporary submarket is the fraction of them with outside utility below R, the second expression immediately
follows. As a result, market tightness in the permanent submarket is given by
p =
vp
up + nt + ut
(12)
The matching function in the temporary submarket is unchanged and is simply given by mt(ut; vt); with
market tightness t = vt=ut.
The value functions in the permanent submarket are dened similarly to those of the baseline model (see
section 2.1). The only di¤erence is the expression for p, that is dened as in (12) as a way to take into
account the composition of the pool of workers searching for a permanent job. Free entry in the permanent
submarket implies that
q(p)J
p
h = c
where Jph is given by (4).
The value functions for the temporary submarket are di¤erent, since workers leave temporary jobs at
rate s+ h(p). When business conditions are good, the value function reads
rJht = yh   w + [s+ + h(p)][Vt   Jht ]
while the value of a vacancy is simply given by
rVt =  c+ q(t)[Jht   Vt]
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so that free entry implies that
q(t)J
h
t = c
where Jht is now given by
Jht =
yh   w
r + s+ + h(p)
(13)
The job creation conditions are still the two key equations, but since now Jht depends also on p they form
a non linear system of two equations in two unknowns that can be solved in cascade10 . The last variable to
be determined is the reservation utility R. The value of unemployment in the temporary submarket reads
rUt(z) = z + h(t)[Et(z)  Ut(z)] + h(p)[Ep(z)  Ut(z)]
where it is clear that an unemployed worker with low outside utility searches both in the temporary and
in the permanent submarket, and can leave the unemployment pool for both types of jobs. Unemployed
workers in the permanent submarket behave as in the baseline model, and their asset value equation for the
unemployment status is provided by (1). Given the expressions for Et(z) and Ep(z) and after some steps of
algebra (see the appendix for details), the reservation utility R reads
R = w   br + s+ + h(t) + h(p)
h(t)
which implies that R < w. Ensuring also that b is small enough11 , we can easily establish that 0 < R < w.
With respect to the base model, the value of a lled temporary job given in (13) is now lower and not
necessarily higher than the value of a permanent one; however, assuming that Jhp < J
h
t , the structure
and functioning of this model is identical to the model without on-the-job search. In particular, the basic
mechanism that ensures that temporary and permanent jobs coexist in equilibrium survives to this admittedly
more realistic scenario. The fact that the value of a permanent job is unchanged while a temporary one
is worth less than before means that rms take into account the possibility that temporary workers leave
their job moving toward the permanent tier and are consequently less prone to post temporary vacancies; in
equilibrium, this leads to a lower tightness in the temporary submarket where a relatively higher congestion
from the point of view of the workers emerges.
7 The empirical analysis
This section aims at testing one of the main implications of the model - namely that the arrival rate of
temporary job o¤ers is larger than that of permanent o¤ers - and at providing further empirical evidence on
10Starting from job creation in the permanent submarket one gets p; using this result with job creation in the temporary
submarket also t is obtained.
11Technically the equilibrium of the model must be such that
b <
h(t)
r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)
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a second one, i.e. that temporary workers receive less training with respect to those with open-ended jobs.
We do this using Italy as a learning case-study. Its labour markets recent developments, indeed, closely
t our theoretical models dynamics. According to the Oecds index of employment protection, during
the last twenty years Italy displayed the deepest deregulation of temporary hires among Oecd countries12 ,
while the legislation on open-ended employment relationships was instead kept almost unchanged. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that in the aftermath of liberalisation only unemployed workers can be
hired under temporary agreements, while in order to quit or transform existing (open-ended) positions,
employers have to rely on natural turnover; in other words Italy is a prominent example of reforms at the
margin, a feature actually shared with many other European countries [European Commission 2010]. On
top of that our case-study also reproduces the models assumption that permanent workers enjoy a higher
unemployment benet b. This is due to two reasons. First, in Italy the access to income-maintenance schemes
for the unemployed primary depends on ones contractual arrangement, with permanent workers enjoying
very generous, despite discretionary, dedicated schemes. Second, the access to provisions that are formally
available to non-standard workers too depends on the fullment of some contribution requirements, so that
workers with more continuous careers - those with open-ended jobs - are more likely to receive the benets.
This last aspect concerns all countries where social protection is based on insurance principles: Germany
and Japan are two other notable examples [Berton et al. 2012]. Eventually Italy also displays a high degree
of contractual persistence - what the model implies unless the outside option z changes in time - and, despite
the use of temporary contracts have been fully liberalised, the creation of open-ended jobs is all but negligible
[Berton et al. forthcoming].
7.1 Econometric strategy and specication issues
Since our primary empirical goal is to test whether the arrival rate of temporary job o¤ers is larger than that
of permanent ones - or, from another perspective, the waiting time for a temporary job is shorter - we are
interested in models in which the duration of unemployment can be compared across exits to di¤erent labour
market states. We thus consider a survival model of unemployment with di¤erent exits. More precisely
we model unemployment as a single duration process that is terminated by one out of M exhaustive and
mutually exclusive possible destinations. We let T be the duration of stay and fDmg a set of M dummies
taking the value of one if state m is entered and zero otherwise. Lancaster [1990] denes the transition
intensity into state m as
m(t) = lim
dt!0
Pr(t  T  t+ dt;Dm = 1jT  t)
dt
12See Brandt et al. [2005] for a discussion in the perspective of the Oecd Jobs Study.
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Following Allison [1982] we model transition intensities - a negative measure of the duration until each exit
- as
m(t) =
exp(0mX)
1 +
MP
m=1
exp(0mX)
where X is a set of covariates. One can show that the resulting likelihood function takes the same form of
the likelihood of a multinomial logit regression applied to a dataset reorganised into a person-period form,
i.e. a form in which every individual in every moment in time can be in one out of M + 1 labour market
states: unemployment or one of the M alternative states [Jenkins 1995; 2005].
Matrix X includes a set of time-dummies fDtg such that Dt = 1[T = t]. This structure is intended to
identify the duration dependence shape without assuming any a-priori parametric functional form and allows
us to test the hypothesis under study in a very straightforward way: by taking exits to open-ended jobs as
the benchmark of the multinomial logit regression, the hypothesis that the waiting time for a temporary job
is shorter than for an open-ended one holds if the coe¢ cients of the time-dummies when m = temporary
are positive. In symbols:
m=temporary[Dt] > 0
In our specication M = 3: possible exits from unemployment are to i) full-time open-ended contracts
with no social security contribution rebates, ii) full-time xed-term direct hire contracts with no social secu-
rity contribution rebates, and iii) other contracts (including self-employment, independent contractorship,
temporary agency work, training, apprenticeship, part-time work and contracts implying rebates on the cost
of labour). This choice allows us to compare contracts that only di¤er with respect to their formal ex-ante
duration, without cost di¤erentials that may a¤ect employersas well as workerschoices. It thus closely
replicates the theoretical models framework.
In order to study whether open-ended jobs imply more investments in training, we follow instead an
indirect strategy. We include in matrix X measures of contract-specic actual experience since the beginning
of ones career and analyse their impact on duration of unemployment until di¤erent exits: as long as open-
ended contracts actually provide workers with more human capital, persistence in unemployment and the
probability of exit to temporary jobs are expected to decrease with the amount of actual experience in
open-ended employment.
7.2 Data and sample selection
The econometric strategy depicted above requires that the dynamics of individual working careers and the
work arrangements are observed in details. For these reasons we decided to use administrative data; in
particular, we use the Work Histories Italian Panel (Whip). Whip is an employer-employee linked database
of individual work histories built using information from the Italian social security administration archives.
The series covers the period from 1985 to 2004. Its reference population includes all the individuals for which
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a payment to or from the social security administration is due during the observed period: all the employees
of the private sector, civil servants with temporary contracts of any type, independent contractors, profes-
sionals without a dedicated social security fund, craftsmen, traders and unemployed workers who receive
an unemployment benet. Observables include individual information such as age, gender, place of birth
and the place of residence; work-related variables are wage, place of work, sector, rm size, occupation, the
relevant collective agreement enforced, the type of contract, beginning and end dates of work relationships13 .
Sample selection aims at overcoming the main limitations of the data. We select all unemployment spells
experienced by workers who entered the labour market between 1998 and 2003 at the age of 19 to 29 at
entry14 . The focus on entrants allows us to observe the whole dynamics of workerscareers and to keep a
detailed track of ones actual and potential experience; on top of being part of our strategy to assess the
theoretical models implications in terms of training and human capital, this also helps to minimise possible
problems that would otherwise arise if the initial portion of ones career was not observed, and fully prevents
left-truncation issues. The purpose of conditions on age at entry is in turn twofold: on the one hand the
lower bound at 19 years old makes our sample more homogeneous, since selected workers are very likely to
hold at least a high school degree, what is important since education is not observed; on the other, the upper
bound drops from the sample most of those workers wrongly dened as entrants, but having instead had
other previous relevant work experiences that, again, are not observed in the data.
The main concerns relate indeed to the identication of unemployment spells. A worker who is not
observed at work in Whip may potentially be i) unemployed ii) out of the labour market or iii) employed in
an unobserved portion of the labour market. Unemployment is formally identied only when the unemployed
workers receive a benet, while unsupported unemployment, non-participation or unobserved employment
cannot be distinguished. In order to minimise the possibility that an individual not observed at work
in the data is instead actually working, we drop from the sample all the workers who had even a single
temporary work experience in the public sector; unobservable regular employment is indeed almost completely
absorbed by open-ended contracts in the public sector and since transitions from private to public sector are
extremely unlikely in Italy, by dropping the individuals who had a temporary experience within the public
administration we exclude from the sample those who are most likely to get an unobserved contract. Non-
participation is then narrowed down by excluding individuals with work experiences as traders or craftsmen
(since self-employment has a negligible leakage to dependent work in the private sector: see Berton et al.
[forthcoming]), in the agricultural sector (in which, according to anecdotal evidence, temporary layo¤s are
widely used) and by right-censoring at 18 months all the sampled spells15 .
The series is then limited since only in the 1998-2003 time-span contractual arrangements can be ob-
13For further details see www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip.
14We dene entrants those workers who are never observed in the data before 1998-2003.
15Further robustness checks about workers attachment to the labor market are discussed in the following. From now on,
however, we conservatively speak of non-employment spells.
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served in full details. Eventually, we dropped all the spells started after a temporary agency or an indepen-
dent/freelance contract - for which we have no information on sector and rm size - and those lasting up
to two months, since they may hide voluntary job-to-job transitions and thus a relevant share of the search
activity.
The resulting sample amounts to 14,248 individuals, for a total of 18,767 unemployment spells and 166,575
monthly person-period observations. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Individuals: 14,248
Entry year % Gender %
1998 17.6 Male 57.8
1999 20.9 Female 42.2
2000 21.2
2001 17.7 Age at entry %
2002 16.2 19-24 70.0
2003 6.5 25-29 30.0
Spells: 18,767
Failure event % Mean duration (months)
Censored 52.1 13.5
Full-time open-ended 12.7 8.0
Full-time xed-term 8.0 7.8
Other 27.3 8.0
Occupation % Work area %
Blue collars 80.1 North-west 24.4
White collars 19.9 North-east 19.9
Center 23.0
South 32.8
Source: own elaborations on Whip data.
7.3 Estimation results
Our main results are presented in the top panel (time spline) of table 2, under columns two and three. The
time-dummy coe¢ cients for exit toward full-time direct-hire temporary jobs with no social security rebates
are signicantly positive until the rst year of search; as implied by our theoretical model, the arrival rate
of (the waiting time for) temporary job o¤ers is thus larger (shorter) than that of (for) permanent ones.
The following panel (experience) displays results concerning the training content of contracts. While actual
experience of any type reduces in general the probability to persist in unemployment16 , we nd that the
number of months spent in open-ended employment adjusts this result by reducing the probability to get
a xed-term job in favour of an open-ended one. Also in the light of results proposed by Berton et al.
[forthcoming] we interpret this result as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that workers with open-ended
jobs accumulate more human capital.
Table 2: estimation results for failure event = full-time direct-hire temporary contracts with no rebates
16Estimation results for persistence in non-employment are not reported here and are available upon request to the authors.
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Full sample Only men No South No seasonal No part-time
14,248 8,241 9,381 13,339 11,056
Covariates Coe¤ . P > |z| Coe¤ . P > |z| Coe¤ . P > |z| Coe¤ . P > |z| Coe¤ . P > |z|
Time spline
Months 3-5 0.5259 0.003 0.6406 0.007 0.6979 0.003 0.5445 0.003 0.4849 0.019
Months 6-8 0.5906 0.001 0.7107 0.002 0.6881 0.002 0.5196 0.003 0.5384 0.006
Months 9-12 0.5571 0.001 0.7878 0.000 0.5969 0.005 0.5264 0.002 0.5886 0.002
Months 13-15 0.2503 0.184 0.5434 0.024 0.5324 0.025 0.2455 0.204 0.2591 0.221
Experience
Actual -0.0083 0.340 -0.0043 0.699 -0.0093 0.405 -0.0099 0.268 -0.0012 0.902
As open-ended -0.0243 0.001 -0.0323 0.000 -0.0197 0.023 -0.0227 0.002 -0.0308 0.000
Potential 0.0159 0.030 0.0204 0.031 0.0143 0.141 0.0160 0.032 0.0088 0.301
No. of contracts 0.0150 0.758 0.0363 0.545 -0.0133 0.808 0.0319 0.537 0.0407 0.436
Second spell 0.0448 0.696 -0.0566 0.689 0.0892 0.516 0.0668 0.580 0.0926 0.467
Third spell -0.0754 0.691 -0.1684 0.485 0.0432 0.849 -0.0697 0.728 0.0044 0.984
Fourth or more 0.1011 0.736 -0.0370 0.918 0.4438 0.220 0.0551 0.862 0.0623 0.853
Female 0.2565 0.001 0.2804 0.003 0.2945 0.000 0.2229 0.013
Unempl. benet 0.4665 0.085 0.6384 0.043 0.7509 0.043 0.3520 0.218 0.3181 0.298
Condition at entry
Age -0.0437 0.000 -0.0424 0.004 -0.0485 0.001 -0.0401 0.002 -0.0424 0.002
Entry in 1999 -0.0519 0.615 -0.0234 0.858 -0.0475 0.703 -0.0898 0.405 -0.0286 0.805
Entry in 2000 0.1760 0.096 0.3165 0.016 0.1693 0.196 0.1181 0.286 0.2084 0.072
Entry in 2001 0.4410 0.000 0.5863 0.000 0.4523 0.004 0.3929 0.003 0.5792 0.000
Entry in 2002 0.6420 0.000 0.7979 0.000 0.7452 0.000 0.6120 0.000 0.7665 0.000
Entry in 2003 0.2403 0.566 0.5938 0.181 0.5314 0.268 0.2079 0.621 0.4333 0.316
Trainee or appr. -0.2637 0.061 -0.2449 0.147 -0.2017 0.227 -0.2745 0.056 -0.2130 0.178
Temporary 0.3823 0.001 0.5565 0.000 0.3725 0.005 0.3967 0.001 0.5072 0.000
Part-time 0.2567 0.082 -0.0654 0.767 0.3372 0.050 0.1777 0.235
Wage (hds. Euros) -0.0046 0.582 -0.0001 0.993 -0.0052 0.660 -0.0037 0.669 -0.0015 0.874
Previous job
North-east 0.1041 0.317 0.1351 0.309 0.1761 0.110 0.1973 0.067 0.0957 0.408
Center 0.3510 0.001 0.4089 0.003 0.3748 0.002 0.3998 0.000 0.3699 0.002
South 0.1253 0.512 0.2688 0.250 0.2412 0.227 0.1524 0.470
Constructions -0.4465 0.000 -0.4384 0.001 -0.3834 0.016 -0.4819 0.000 -0.4214 0.001
Services 0.2096 0.013 0.2157 0.036 0.1375 0.184 0.1837 0.038 0.1772 0.049
Firm size: 16-50 0.0970 0.317 0.1031 0.394 0.1026 0.397 0.0716 0.486 0.1046 0.319
Firm size: 51-100 0.2230 0.058 0.0975 0.504 0.1660 0.257 0.2268 0.065 0.1802 0.160
Firm size: > 100 0.2206 0.013 0.3338 0.002 0.1630 0.124 0.2371 0.010 0.2466 0.013
White collars 0.3834 0.000 0.5238 0.000 0.4832 0.000 0.3813 0.000 0.4147 0.000
Trainee or appr. 0.5414 0.000 0.4406 0.014 0.5118 0.003 0.5767 0.000 0.5256 0.001
Temporary 1.0744 0.000 0.9198 0.000 0.9376 0.000 1.0909 0.000 1.0405 0.000
Part-time -0.3257 0.029 -0.1712 0.424 -0.3382 0.054 -0.2338 0.124
Wage (hds. Euros) 0.0020 0.800 -0.0036 0.705 0.0013 0.911 0.0010 0.905 -0.0011 0.905
Youth un. rate 0.0030 0.633 0.0021 0.783 0.0089 0.297 0.0006 0.922 0.0048 0.483
Constant -1.3546 0.001 -1.7751 0.000 -1.3092 0.009 -1.4216 0.001 -1.4491 0.001
Note: bold if 95% signicant; benchmark: full-time open-ended contracts with no rebates
Source: own elaborations on Whip data.
The other coe¢ cients suggest that exits to full-time xed-term jobs are more likely for women - employers
might be less prone to hire young women under an open-ended contract for the risk of a poorer attachment to
the job, due for instance to maternity leaves and childcare - and for younger individuals, who may participate
only occasionally to the labour market; on top of that, age at entry also captures the e¤ect of education, and
less educated workers have less bargaining power and may require a longer probation period. Exits to full-
time direct-hire temporary contracts turn out to be more frequent also for workers who entered the labour
market in 2001 and 2002 - what can be explained by the enforcement, in 2001, of Directive 1999/70/CE,
which further deregulated the use of this type of contracts - and for those who already had temporary work
experiences (including training and apprenticeship contracts) in the past; this result mirrors the high degree
of persistence that characterises temporary employment in Italy [Berton et al. forthcoming]. The negative
coe¢ cients of having entered unemployment after a job in the construction sector and a part-time contract
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are then due to the joint e¤ect of a high sectoral persistence and of an actually much lower employment
protection for open-ended workers for the former, and to a preference for going on searching or for non-
participation for the latter. Having had a job in central Italy, in the service sector, in a large rm and as
white collar increases instead the probability of getting a full-time direct-hire temporary job.
7.4 Discussion of empirical results
Despite the many advantages that administrative data brings to our empirical analysis - being the possibility
to observe the dynamics of individual working careers without measurement errors or recall bias and with full
details on ones working arrangement the most relevant to our purposes - Whip also presents some drawbacks
that may a¤ect our results.
We already mentioned about the impossibility to distinguish between unemployment, non-participation
and employment in unobserved portions of the labour market. By sampling workers never observed as civil
servants we already prevent the major source of unobservable employment, i.e. open-ended contracts in the
public sector; however, another relevant area of unobservable employment is represented by the underground
economy, which is obviously not recorded in administrative data. To check the robustness of our results to the
possibility that a number of workers may exit from unemployment to an irregular job, we re-estimated our
model on a sub-sample of workers from central and northern regions only, where the underground economy
is less widespread. Results are presented in table 2 under columns six and seven; as the reader can easily see,
we can maintain our main conclusions. Analogously, under columns four and ve and from eight to eleven,
we check the robustness of our results to the presence of non-participation by excluding from the sample the
group of workers that are more likely to - maybe temporarily - abandon the labour market: women, seasonal
and part-time workers. Again, our conclusions still hold.
Another relevant limitation of the data is given by the small number of covariates. This raises the issue
of unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately, the usual econometric tools to control for its presence are in our
case of little help. On the one hand, xed-e¤ect strategies are not viable in duration models [see Magnac
2000]; on the other, duration models with random e¤ects rely on the hypothesis of orthogonality between
observed and unobserved components, what implicitly rules out the capability to control for a number of
relevant (unobserved) covariates like, for instance, individual ability and education. In any case, only 30% of
the sample is observed at least twice, and only 10% three times or more: this means that strategies involving
repeated observations would imply an extremely strong sample selection. We used however some alternative
strategies to circumvent the problem. First, we included in the specication some variables that capture
the e¤ect of the main sources of unobserved heterogeneity, namely age at entry for education, and type of
contract and wage at entry for individual ability. Second, we estimated robust standard errors by clustering
observations by individual. Third, semi-parametric specications of duration dependence like the one we
used are proved to be robust to the presence of unobserved components [Dolton and Van der Klaauw 1999].
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Fourth, we argue that the e¤ect of unobserved components - individual ability in particular - would be an
underestimate of the parameters of interest. Indeed, the most endowed individuals are more likely to nd an
open-ended job, and to nd it more quickly; as time goes by, therefore, the sample is left with less and less
endowed individuals, who are instead more likely to get a temporary contract. Controlling for individual
ability would thus reinforce our conclusions.
Our last concern is about the di¤erence between the arrival rate of job o¤ers and the job accepting rate.
In our theoretical model job o¤ers are always viable, which implies that there is no di¤erence between the
two rates. In real world, however, workers may choose to give up on an o¤er in order to go on searching for
a better one. What we actually measure is thus the duration until acceptance, and not until the arrival of a
job o¤er as the theoretical model would suggest. But since workers are more likely to give up on a temporary
job than on a permanent one, our results lay again on the safe side.
8 Additional Evidence and Implications
To the best of our knowledge the issue of unemployment duration until temporary vs. permanent contracts
has been seldom studied directly. The implication that the waiting time for a temporary job is shorter holds
in the Netherlands [De Graaf-Zijl et al. 2011], in Slovenia [Van Ours and Vodopivec 2008] and in Spain
[Bover and Gomez 2004], while an analogous e¤ect does not emerge in France [Blanchard and Landier 2002]
or in the US [Hotchkiss 1999]. The empirical evidence in turn largely supports the hypothesis that temporary
workers receive less on-the-job training. Arulampalam and Booth [1998] investigate the relationship between
employment exibility and training using UK data, and nd that workers on temporary contracts are less
likely to receive work-related training. The same result holds also for Spain [Albert et al. 2005] as well as for
the majority of European countries [Bassanini et al. 2007; European Commission 2010; Oecd 2002], what
recently gave rise to a stream of literature concerning the (negative) impact of temporary employment on
labour productivity [Dolado and Stucchi 2008].
The model features several other empirical implications. First, it implies a transitional dynamics on
employment in the aftermath of the liberalisation of temporary contracts. These transitional e¤ects have
been studied by Boeri and Garibaldi [2007]; they show that most countries that experienced a gradual
liberalisation of temporary contracts experienced also employment gains. Such honeymoon e¤ect is clearly
present in the mechanism analysed in this paper, as well as the possibility that it may fade out in the long
run, as argued by Kahn [2010]. Second, the model implies that workers with a poor non-employment option
put a high value on nding a job quickly, thus sorting into the temporary submarket; this is consistent with
the idea that higher unemployment benets allow workers to be more selective in the job search process,
thus increasing the job match quality [Belzil 2001; Caliendo et al. 2009; Fitzenberger and Wilke 2010; Van
der Klundert 1990]. Last, Jahn and Bentzen [2010] argue that during economic upturns unemployed workers
are more condent to nd a permanent job quickly, what rations labour demand and tightens the market
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for temporary jobs; this is consistent with another key result of our model, namely that a labour demand
trade-o¤ between ex-ante slower job lling rate and ex-post more exible dismissal rate exists.
9 Concluding Remarks
The liberalisation of xed-term contracts in Europe has led to a two-tier regime, with a growing share of
jobs covered by temporary contracts that is particularly pronounced in countries where the employment
protection legislation di¤erential with respect to workers with open-ended contracts is largest [Booth et al.
2002]. In this perspective the present paper proposed and solved a matching model with direct search in
which temporary and permanent jobs coexist in a long-run equilibrium. The intuition is as follows: when
temporary contracts are allowed, rms are willing to open permanent jobs in as much as their job lling rate
is faster than that of temporary jobs. From the labour supply standpoint an analogous trade-o¤ between ex-
ante lower job nding rate and ex-post larger retention rate emerges. The theory has several further empirical
implications. First, the liberalisation of temporary contracts does not crowd out permanent contracts and
the system moves smoothly to a dual regime. Second, in the aftermath of liberalisation the economy enjoys
an employment gain that may nonetheless completely fade away in the long run. Third, workers covered
with open-ended contracts are more likely to receive training. Fourth, the basic functioning of the model
survives to the scenario in which employed temporary workers are allowed to search on the job.
The prediction that the job o¤er arrival rate for temporary workers is higher is supported by our analysis
of Italian administrative data. Using a competing-risks duration model of unemployment we nd indeed
that, other things being equal, the transition rates to temporary jobs is higher than to permanent jobs. The
other empirical implications of the model, and in particular that temporary workers receive less training, are
consistent with the existing literature.
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A Existence
The coexistence of the two submarkets in equilibrium depends on the existence of a positive reservation outside utility
strictly lower than the wage. We show this result in two steps.
 Existence of R. Since both Up(z) and Ut(z) are linear and monotonically increasing in z, R does exist (and
moreover is unique) if and only if Ut(z = 0) < Up(z = 0) and
@Up(z)
@z
>
@Ut(z)
@z
. Using equation (8) and
(9), the condition on the slopes says that
r + s
r + s+ h(p)
>
r + s+ 
r + s+ + h(t)
and the one on the intercepts reads
h(t)w
r + s+ + h(t)
>
h(p)w + (r + s)b
h(t)(w   b) (14)
 Existence of the two submarkets. The existence of a reservation outside option is a necessary but not su¢ cient
condition for the coexistence of temporary and permanent contracts in equilibrium. We already know, in fact,
that if R  w all workers search for a temporary job. We need then that
R < w ) w   b (r + s)[r + s+ + h(t)]
(r + s)h(t)  (r + s+ )h(p) < w )
(r + s)h(t) > (r + s+ )h(p))
r + s
r + s+ 
>
h(p)
h(t)
and we can conclude that if (14) holds then R exists and is lower than the wage.
B Dynamics
In the rigid market all the workforce is either employed with a permanent contract or unemployed
up + np = 1
The di¤erential equations describing the dynamics of these two components therefore does not depend on the outside
utility and read
:
up() = snp()  h(p)up()
:
np() = h(p)up()  snp()
Its easy to see that when the old regime reaches its steady state the stocks amount to
up =
s
s+ h(p)
and
np =
h(p)
s+ h(p)
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As we pointed out above, in order to fully describe the dynamic behaviour of employed and unemployed workers
in both submarkets we need to separately consider people with outside option below and above the reservation value
R. In every moment in time the distribution of the formers reads
F (z) = np(z; ) + nt(z; ) + ut(z; ); z  R (15)
When  = 0 the stock of workers who start searching in the new submarket is given by the fraction of unemployed
workers of the previous regime whose outside option is lower than R
ut(z;  = 0) =
sF (z)
s+ h(p)
; z  R (16)
Since right after the introduction of the new regime nobody works with a temporary contract (nt(z;  = 0) = 0),
the initial condition for permanently employed workers with z  R can be obtained through (15)
np(z;  = 0) = F (z)  ut(z;  = 0)  nt(z;  = 0))
np(z;  = 0) = F (z)  sF (z)
s+ h(p)
  0 =
=
h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
; z  R (17)
We are now in a position to describe the dynamic behaviour of np; nt and ut provided z  R.
 In the rigid market a fraction of workers was employed with a permanent contract even if endowed with a low
outside option. From  = 0 onwards, once they are red (what happens at rate s), they start searching in the
temporary submarket with no possibility to come back to the permanent tier
:
np(z; ) =  snp(z; ))
:
np(z; ) + snp(z; ) = 0)Z
es [
:
np(z; ) + snp(z; )]d = b1 )
np(z; )e
s + b0 = b1 ) np(z; ) = Be s ; z  R
where b0 and b1 are constants of integration. Using (17) and solving for B
np(z; 0) = B =
h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
; z  R
therefore
np(z; ) =
h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e s ; z  R (18)
i.e. the initial stock of permanent workers with a low outside option decreases at rate s down to zero; in fact
lim
!1np(z  R; ) = 0
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 Since in the rigid market only permanent contracts were allowed, right after the shock the stock of temporary
workers is an empty set, but immediately rms post temporary vacancies and ll them at rate h(t) by hiring
from the stock of temporaryunemployed. Temporary matches are then destroyed at rate s+ 
:
nt(z; ) = h(t)ut(z; )  (s+ )nt(z; )
using (15) and (18) one gets
:
nt(z; ) = h(t)[F (z)  np(z; )  nt(z; )]  (s+ )nt(z; ))
:
nt(z; ) + [h(t) + s+ ]nt(z; ) = h(t)

F (z)  h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e s

)
e[h(t)+s+]
 :
nt(z; ) + [h(t) + s+ ]nt(z; )
	
= e[h(t)+s+]h(t)

F (z)  h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e s

)
nt(z; )e
[h(t)+s+] + b0 =
Z
h(t)F (z)e
[h(t)+s+]d  
Z
h(t)h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e[h(t)+]d )
nt(z; )e
[h(t)+s+] = b0 +
h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
e[h(t)+s+] + b1   h(t)h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][h(t) + ]
e[h(t)+] + b2 )
nt(z; ) = Be
 [h(t)+s+] +
h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
  h(t)h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][h(t) + ]
e s z  R
A unique solution for the dynamics of nt(z; ) is obtained imposing the initial condition nt(z; 0) = 0, solving
for B and substituting the expression below into the previous equation
B =
h(t)h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][h(t) + ]
  h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
; z  R
The stock of temporary workers therefore grows from zero to
lim
!1nt(z; ) =
h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
; z  R
 The dynamic behaviour of ut is not simply the reverse of nt. The stock of workers looking for a temporary
job grows also because people with z  R eventually loose their permanent job at rate s and move to the
temporary tier
:
ut(z; ) = snp(z; ) + (s+ )nt(z; )  h(t)ut(z; ); z  R
Again, using (15) with (18)
:
ut(z; ) = snp(z; ) + (s+ )[F (z)  ut(z; )  np(z; )]  h(t)ut(z; ))
:
ut(z; ) + [h(t) + s+ ]ut(z; ) = (s+ )F (z)  h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e s )
e[h(t)+s+]
 :
ut(z; ) + [h(t) + s+ ]ut(z; )
	
= e[h(t)+s+]

(s+ )F (z)  h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e s

)
ut(z; )e
[h(t)+s+] + b0 =
Z
(s+ )F (z)e[h(t)+s+]d  
Z
h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e[h(t)+]d
ut(z; ) = Be
 [h(t)+s+] +
(s+ )F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
  h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
e s ; z  R
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Imposing the initial condition (16) and solving for B one gets a unique solution for the dynamics of ut(z; )
B = F (z)

s
s+ h(p)
+
h(p)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
  s+ 
h(t) + s+ 

; z  R
The stock of unemployed workers on the temporary market therefore goes from the initial level
ut(z;  = 0) =
sF (z)
s+ h(p)
; z  R
to its steady state value
lim
!1ut(z; ) =
(s+ )F (z)
s+ + h(t)
; z  R
Let us now turn to the stock of workers with z > R. People with large outside utility never move from the
permanent tier; in every moment in time they are either employed or unemployed with a permanent contract
1  F (z) = up(z; ) + np(z; ); z > R (19)
The initial stock of unemployed workers searching for a permanent job is given by the proportion of unemployed
workers in the old regime with z > R
up(z;  = 0) =
s[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
; z > R (20)
Using (19) one gets the initial condition for np(z > R; )
np(z;  = 0) =
h(p)[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
; z > R
 The stock of unemployed with z > R increases when permanently employed workers with large outside option
leave their jobs and decreases when they nd a new one
:
up(z; ) = snp(z; )  h(p)up(z; ); z > R
using (19)
:
up(z; ) + [s+ h(p)]up(z; ) = s[1  F (z)])
e[s+h(p)]
 :
up(z; ) + [s+ h(p)]up(z; )
	
= s[1  F (z)]e[s+h(p)] )
up(z; )e
[s+h(p)] + bo = s[1  F (z)]
Z
e[s+h(p)]d )
up(z; ) = Be
 [s+h(p)] +
s[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
; z > R
As usual, a unique solution is obtained through the imposition of the initial condition in (20); solving by B
one gets
B =
s[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
  s[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
= 0)
up(z; ) =
s[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
; z > R
The stock of unemployed workers in the permanent market does not depend on time: its level is constant
during the transition to the new steady state.
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 The dynamics of np(z > R; ) is its exact reverse
:
np(z; ) = h(p)up(z; )  snp(z; ); z > R
Using (19)
:
np(z; ) = h(p)[1  F (z)  np(z; )]  snp(z; ))
:
np(z; ) + [h(p) + s]np(z; ) = h(p)[1  F (z)])
e[h(p)+s]
 :
np(z; ) + [h(p) + s]np(z; )
	
= h(p)[1  F (z)]e[h(p)+s] )
np(z; )e
[h(p)+s] + b0 = h(p)[1  F (z)]
Z
e[h(p)+s]d )
np(z; ) = Be
 [h(p)+s] +
h(p)[1  F (z)]
h(p) + s
; z > R
The imposition of the initial condition for  = 0 yields the unique value of B
h(p)[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
= B +
h(p)[1  F (z)]
h(p) + s
) B = 0) np(z > R; ) = h(p)[1  F (z)]
h(p) + s
; z > R
So also the dynamic equation of np(z > R; ) does not depend on time; nonetheless we have to keep in mind
that the full dynamics for np depends also on workers with z  R:
We are now in a position to describe the whole dynamics of the system. nt(z; ) and ut(z; ) are fully determined
by workers with z  R, while up(z; ) by the ones with z > R; np(z; ) depends on both
nt(z; ) = nt(z  R; ) =

h(t)h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][h(t) + ]
  h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 

e [h(t)+s+]+
+
h(t)F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
  h(t)h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][h(t) + ]
e s
ut(z; ) = ut(z  R; ) = F (z)

s
s+ h(p)
+
h(p)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
  s+ 
h(t) + s+ 

e [h(t)+s+]+
+
(s+ )F (z)
h(t) + s+ 
  h(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
e s
up(z; ) = up(z > R; ) =
s[1  F (z)]
s+ h(p)
np(z; ) = np(z  R; ) + np(z > R; ) = h(p)F (z)
s+ h(p)
e s +
h(p)[1  F (z)]
h(p) + s
Taking lim!1 and using z = R one gets the expressions for the two tiers steady state.
C The honeymoon e¤ect
In order to prove the existence of what we called the honeymoon e¤ectof the introduction of temporary jobs we take
the time derivative of the equation describing the dynamics of total unemployment and evaluate it at  = 0; more
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precisely, since permanent unemployment does not display any dynamics (see the subsection above), we will focus
on the behaviour of temporary unemployment. If the liberalisation of temporary contracts leads to an immediate
reduction of total unemployment, the time derivative of temporary unemployment evaluated at  = 0 must be
negative. From section 9.2 we know that
ut() = F (R)

s
s+ h(p)
+
h(p)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
  s+ 
h(t) + s+ 

e [h(t)+s+]+
+
(s+ )F (R)
h(t) + s+ 
  h(p)F (R)
[s+ h(p)] [h(t) + ]
e s )
@ut()
@
=  [s+ + h(t)]F (z)

s
s+ h(p)
+
h(p)
[s+ h(p)][+ h(t)]
  s+ 
s+ + h(t)


 e [s++h(t)] + sh(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][+ h(t)]
e s
imposing  = 0
@ut()
@ j = 0 = (s+ )F (z) 
s[s+ + h(t)]F (z)
s+ h(p)
  h(p)F (z)[s+ + h(t)]
[s+ h(p)][+ h(t)]
+
+
sh(p)F (z)
[s+ h(p)][+ h(t)]
=
Omitting the common denominator, which is not relevant for the sign of the expression above, one gets
[s+ h(p)][+ h(t)](s+ )F (z)  s[+ h(t)][s+ + h(t)]F (z)+
  h(p)F (z)[s+ + h(t)] + sh(p)F (z) =
= h(p)[+ h(t)](s+ )F (z)  s[+ h(t)]h(t)F (z)+
  h(p)F (z)[s+ + h(t)] + sh(p)F (z) =
= [+ h(t)]F (z)[h(p)(s+ )  sh(t)  h(p)] =
= [+ h(t)]F (z) fs[h(p)  h(t)]g < 0
D Search on the job
The proof of the existence of the equilibrium in the model with on the job search follows the lines of section 9.1:
we need to nd the conditions for the existence of a positive reservation outside utility that is strictly lower than
the wage. Once t and p are determined by sequentially solving the job creation conditions system (see section 6),
both Ut and Up are linear functions of z; a positive R therefore exists when the intercept of Ut is larger than the
intercept of Up and its slope is smaller
17 . We will then prove that under the same conditions not only R is positive,
but is also strictly lower than w.
17 In principle, the existence of a positive R would be shown also under the opposite conditions, i.e. a higher intercept and a
smaller slope for Up; however, as a few steps of algebra will make clear, the slope of Up is always larger than the one of Ut.
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The value functions for the supply side of the permanent submarket look as in section 2.1
rEp(z) = w + s[Up(z)  Ep(z)]
rUp(z) = z + b+ h(p)[Ep(z)  Up(z)]
so that the value of unemployment for a permanent worker reads
Up(z) =
(z + b)(r + s) + h(p)w
r[r + s+ h(p)]
In the temporary submarket the asset equations are a bit more complicated, since workers leave their temporary jobs
not only because of natural turnover, but also when a permanent vacancy becomes available
rEt(z) = w + h(p)[Ep(z)  Et(z)] + (s+ )[Ut(z)  Et(z)]
rUt(z) = z + h(t)[Et(z)  Ut(z)] + h(p)[Ep(z)  Ut(z)]
Using Et(z), Ep(z) and Up(z) one gets the expression for Ut(z)
Ut(z) =
[r + s+ + h(p)]z
[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)]
+
f(r + s)h(t) + h(t)h(p) + h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)]gw
(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)]
+
+
h(p)s[(z + b)(r + s) + h(p)w]
r(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ h(p)]
We are now ready to go through the steps of the proof.
 Condition on the slopes: @Up=@z > @Ut=@z
(r + s)
r[r + s+ h(p)]
>
r + s+ + h(p)
[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)]
+
sh(p)
r[r + h(p)][r + s+ h(p)]
Using and omitting the common denominator (which is not relevant for the sign) one gets
(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)]  r[r + s+ + h(p)][r + s+ h(p)]+
  sh(p)[r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)] > 0)
[r2 + rh(p) + rs][+ h(t)]  r[r + s+ h(p)] > 0)
r2h(t) + rh(t)h(p) + rsh(t) > 0 always
 Condition on the intercepts: Up(0) < Ut(0)
b(r + s) + h(p)w
r[r + s+ h(p)]
<
f(r + s)h(t) + h(p)h(t) + h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)]gw
(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]
+
+
h(p)sb(r + s) + h(p)sh(p)w
r(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ h(p)]
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Multiplying both sides by the common denominator the expression reads
(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)][b(r + s) + h(p)w]+
  r[r + s+ h(p)] f(r + s)h(t) + h(p)h(t) + h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)]gw+
  [r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)][h(p)sb(r + s) + h(p)sh(p)w] < 0;
[r2 + rh(p) + rs][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]b(r + s)+
+ (r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]h(p)w+
  rw[r + s+ h(p)](r + s)h(t)  rw[r + s+ h(p)]h(t)h(p)+
  rw[r + s+ h(p)]h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)]  [r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)][h(p)swh(p)] < 0;
[r2 + rh(p) + rs][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]b(r + s)+
+ [r2 + rh(p) + rs][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]h(p)w   rw[r + s+ h(p)](r + s)h(t)+
  rw[r + s+ h(p)][h(t)h(p)]  rw[r + s+ h(p)]h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)] < 0;
[r2 + rh(p) + rs][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]b(r + s)+
  w[r3h(t) + 2r2sh(t) + rs2h(t) + rsh(p)h(t) + r2h(p)h(t)] < 0;
[r2 + rh(p) + rs][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]b(r + s)  wrh(t)[(r + s)2 + h(p)(r + s)] < 0;
[r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]b < wh(t))
b <
wh(t)
[r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]
(21)
that is the condition for the existence of a positive reservation outside option.
By equating Up(z) to Ut(z) and solving for z = R, we are now in a position to determine its exact value:
(R+ b)(r + s) + h(p)w
r[r + s+ h(p)]
=
[r + s+ + h(p)]R
[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)]
+
+
f(r + s)h(t) + h(t)h(p) + h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)]gw
(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)]
+
h(p)s[(R+ b)(r + s) + h(p)w]
r(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ h(p)]
;
Collecting terms with R and multiplying both sides by the common denominator one gets
(r + s)

(r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]  r[r + s+ h(p)][r + s+ + h(p)]+
 sh(p)[r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]

R =
= wr[r + s+ h(p)] f(r + s)h(t) + h(t)h(p) + h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)]g+
+ [r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)][h(p)sb(r + s) + h(p)sh(p)w]+
  [b(r + s) + h(p)w](r + s)[r + h(p)][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)];
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For simplicity we separately consider the two sides of the equation; starting from the rhs
w

r[r + s+ h(p)](r + s)h(t) + r[r + s+ h(p)]h(p)h(t) + r[r + s+ h(p)]h(p)[r + s+ + h(p)]+
 h(p)[r + s+ + h(t) + h(p)][r2 + rs+ rh(p)]

+
  b(r + s)[r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)][r2 + rs+ rh(p)] =
w[r2 + rs+ rh(p)](r + s)h(t)  b(r + s)[r2 + rs+ rh(p)][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)] =
= [r2 + rs+ rh(p)](r + s) fh(t)w   b[r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]g
The lhs in turn reads
(r + s)R

[r2 + rs+ rh(p)][r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)]  [r2 + rs+ rh(p)][r + s+ + h(p)]
	
=
= h(t)(r + s)[r
2 + rs+ rh(p)]
so that
Rh(t) = h(t)w   b[r + s+ + h(p) + h(t)])
R = w   br + s+ + h(p) + h(t)
h(t)
which implies that R < w; moreover, under condition (21), 0 < R < w.
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